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Summary 
On 5 October 2000, the citizens of Serbia toppled Slobodan Milošević in what came to be 
known as the “Bulldozer Revolution”. This watershed event symbolizes not only the end 
of a decade of authoritarian rule but also the beginning of a double transition: from 
authoritarian rule to democracy, on the one hand, and from a series of armed conflicts to 
peace, on the other. This transition has thoroughly transformed Serbian politics in 
general and Serbia’s security sector in particular. This October, Serbia’s democracy 
celebrated its tenth anniversary. The jubilee is an appropriate opportunity to reflect on 
the past decade. With this aim in mind, the report will seek to analyse the impact of 
democratization on security sector governance in Serbia over the period 2000-2010. 
In order to do so, in the first part of the report we have developed an analytical 
framework for studying democratic security sector governance, which is defined as the 
transparent organization and management of the security sector based on the 
accountability of decision-makers, respect for the rule of law and human rights, checks 
and balances, equal representation, active civic participation, public agreement and 
democratic oversight. Thus defined, democratic security sector governance can be 
analyzed through its five dimensions: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, 
rule of law, representativeness, and transparency. 
In the second part, the report discusses the wider context in which both 
democratization and security sector reform have taken place. As is shown, a set of 
structural, institutional and ideational factors have been constraining fast and 
comprehensive democratic security sector reforms. In the third part, the paper analyzes 
both the achievements made and the challenges faced by Serbia in the five dimensions of 
democratic security sector governance over the past decade. It concludes that formal 
mechanisms of democratic security sector governance have largely been established, albeit 
slowly and imperfectly. Additionally, it shows that the implementation of both the letter 
and the spirit of the newly introduced democratic norms have yet to be consolidated in 
practice. The biggest achievement has been made in the establishment of civilian 
executive control, while weak parliamentary oversight remains the central challenge. 
In the final part, we offer several policy recommendations. First, we argue that it is of 
the utmost importance that both domestic policy-makers and the international 
community begin to pay more attention not only to the establishment of a formal 
institutional framework but also to the question of the practical implementation of 
democratic security sector reforms. It is argued that the EU has a key role to play here 
through its conditionality policy. Second, we call for a set of constitutional and legislative 
changes which could improve the institutional framework for democratic security sector 
governance in Serbia. Third, the report proposes that more space and capacities should be 
created so that the National Assembly and other oversight bodies can control and oversee 
the rest of the security sector autonomously and effectively. Fourth, we propose ways to 
intensify the active participation of civil society in security and defence matters.   
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1.  Introduction 
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of democratic transition and European 
integration for most of the Central and Eastern European countries.1 In contrast, the 
Western Balkan region experienced the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and another decade 
of post-communist authoritarianism. In Serbia, Slobodan Milošević established a regime 
which was formally a democracy but in practice the opposite. Although a multiparty 
system was formally introduced in 1992, it only served as a façade to hide the true 
authoritarian nature of the regime. Slobodan Milošević and his regime relied heavily on 
the powerful security sector inherited from the Socialist Yugoslavia.2 Its military, police 
and intelligence services played an important role in supporting Serbs in the Bosnian and 
Croatian wars. But from March 1991, when battle tanks were taken out onto the streets of 
Belgrade to suppress the rally against Slobodan Milošević, up until the war with the KLA 
and NATO in 1998/1999, their central role was inside Serbia. Throughout the 1990s, their 
main task was to keep in power one of the last authocracies in Europe. 
On 5 October 2000, several hundred thousand people gathered in the streets of 
Belgrade to protest against the fraudulent presidential elections held by the regime of 
Slobodan Milošević, at the time still President of the rump Yugoslavia composed of Serbia 
and Montenegro.3 This event, often nicknamed the ‘Bulldozer Revolution’, is a watershed 
event in Serbia’s recent history. It marked the end of Milošević’s decade-long authoritar-
ian rule and the beginning of a process of double transition, from authoritarian rule to 
democracy, on the one hand, and from a series of armed conflicts to peace, on the other. 
Nevertheless, although the experience of Central and Eastern European countries 
suggested that security sector reform was a necessary precondition for democratization; 
in Serbia it only took place in a partial and very slow fashion. Serbia’s new democratic 
elites had to cope with a far more complex set of challenges than their Central and Eastern 
European counterparts, including but not limited to exceptionally strong nationalist 
forces in society, war crimes, the unresolved relationship with Montenegro and Kosovo, 
 
 
1  The report will draw on two projects that the author has participated in. The first is Mapping and 
Monitoring of Security Sector Reform conducted by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (Belgrade) in 
2007 and 2008 and presented in Hadžić/Milosavljević/Stojanović/Ejdus 2009. The second is 
The Image of the Democratic Soldier: Tensions Between the Organisation of Armed Forces and the 
Principles of Democracy in European Comparison organized by Peace Research Institute Frankfurt from 
2006 to 2010 (book forthcoming). I am grateful to Dragana Đurašinović, Dušan Pavlović, Sabine Mannitz, 
Bruno Schoch, Thorsten Gromes and other colleagues from PRIF for their comments on the earlier drafts 
of this paper.  
2  In 1990, Yugoslav People’s Army was 180,000 strong (IISS 1990: 95). By 1999, the military of the rump 
Yugoslavia shrank to 108,700 (IISS 1999: 102). Milošević also maintained a strong and highly militarized 
police, estimated to also have around 100,000 men. 
3  Milošević resigned two days later recognizing the victory of his counter-candidate Vojislav Kostunica. In 
December 2000, a coalition of opposition parties (DOS) won a landslide majority in the parliamentary 
elections. 
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armed rebellion in South Serbia in 2001, and the assassination of the first democratically 
elected Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in 2003 in an attempted coup d'état resulting in the 
state of emergency. Moreover, deep divisions within the new democratic elite on both 
personal and ideological grounds slowed down and at times even paralyzed progress on 
any of the key issues.  
Serbia’s democracy is celebrating its tenth anniversary this fall. The jubilee is a con-
venient opportunity for a reflection on the first decade of democratization. This report 
will ask to what extent the process of democratic reforms has influenced security sector 
governance in Serbia. This question is important for several reasons. First, democratic 
security sector governance is a key to the consolidation of democracy. Unless the security 
apparatus on which the former repressive order relied is brought to democratic account-
ability, it will remain a constant threat to democracy. Second, democratic security sector 
governance is also crucial for a sustainable peace in the region. As democratic peace 
theory suggests, democracies do not fight each other. Put differently, as long as states in 
the Western Balkans region and their security forces are governed in a democratic 
fashion, the chances are very small that there will be a resurgence of armed conflict. 
The main argument presented in this report is twofold. First, despite the enormous 
challenges that Serbia has faced over the past decade, the new institutional framework for 
democratic security sector governance has been slowly and gradually put in place. Second, 
it will be argued that there is still a huge gap between the newly established norms and 
institutions, on the one hand, and how things are getting done in practice, on the other. 
Although the security sector no longer represents a threat to democracy, democratic 
practices have yet to become consolidated and acquire validity and stability. The report 
will consist of three parts. In the first, the concept of democratic security governance will 
be introduced. In the second part, the wider context in which the democratic reforms 
took place will be discussed. Against this backdrop, the third part will analyze the 
democratization of security sector governance in Serbia during the period between 2000 
and 2010. The conclusion will go on to summarize the main findings and offer several 
policy recommendations. 
2.  Democratic security sector governance: a framework for analysis 
Democratic governance has acquired the status of a norm in the international system in 
the course of the last two hundred years (Franck 1992). Several waves of democratization, 
more intensive international security cooperation, and the gradual professionalization of 
the armed forces have led to an increasing interest in the democratic civilian control of 
the security sector in old and new democracies alike (Born 2002). It has been argued that 
the more the legitimate use of coercive force is controlled, managed and scrutinized in a 
democratic fashion, the higher will be the level of socio-political cohesion within a state 
and the more effective will be its foreign policies (Russett 1990; Sorensen 1993). Further-
more, Democratic Peace Theory argues that the democratic governance of the security 
sector contributes positively to the peaceful resolution of international conflicts (Doyle 
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1983; Russett 1993). Finally, the democratic management and oversight of the security 
sector proved to be a central aspect of transformation in both post-authoritarian and 
post-conflict societies.  
It became evident that neither democracy nor peace can become consolidated without 
comprehensive democratic security sector reforms for two main reasons. First, the corpo-
rate interests of certain institutions in the security sector were often opposed to 
democratic transformation due to the pivotal role these institutions had by default in both 
maintaining autocracy and during armed conflict.4 Second, their monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force meant that these institutions were potentially a powerful veto 
player that could slow down or even block democratic transition entirely. Therefore, one 
of the first goals of new democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe was to place 
security sectors under their democratic civilian control. However, it soon emerged that 
this was a necessary but not sufficient step. Neither the legislative nor judicial branches of 
government possessed sufficient expertise to effectively manage and oversee operations 
within the security sector. In addition, civil society was concerned with economic and 
social issues and showed no interest in participating actively in security and defence 
matters.  
The concept of ‘democratic security sector governance’ has been increasingly used in 
recent scholarly and practitioners’ debates in order to capture this reality (Cottey/ 
Edmunds/Forster 2002; Hänggi 2003; Ball 2005; Ghebali/Lambert 2007). For the purpose 
of this report, ‘democratic security sector governance’ will be defined as a transparent 
organization and management of the security sector based on the accountability of 
decision-makers, respect for the rule of law and human rights, checks and balances, equal 
representation, active civic participation, public agreement, and democratic oversight.  
The concept of ‘democratic security sector governance’ is at the same time an analyti-
cal and normative concept. It not only helps us to understand what is going on in the 
security sector, but also indicates what should be done. Democratic security sector 
governance should be distinguished from ‘security sector reform’, which has a wider 
meaning and refers, as Timothy Edmunds puts it, to “the process through which security 
sector actors adapt to the political and organizational demands of transformation” 
(Edmunds 2007: 25). Security sector reform is also not a value-neutral concept but one 
that was developed by the international donor community within normative discourses 
about the connection between development and democracy (Brzoska 2003). Its aim is, in 
the words of Heiner Hänggi, “the efficient and effective provision of state and human 
security within a framework of democratic governance” (Hänggi 2004: 4). Therefore, 
democratic security governance can be seen as one of several possible goals of ‘security 
sector reform’. 
 
 
4  Security sector will be defined as comprising all the institutions and actors whose responsibility is the 
application, management, control and oversight of the legitimate use of coercive force. 
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However, democratic security sector governance should also be distinguished from 
democratic civilian control. Civilian control denotes a form of horizontal accountability 
and refers to the subordination of security forces to civilians who are, nevertheless, not 
necessarily endowed with democratic credentials.5 ‘Democratic civilian control’ is a wider 
concept than civilian control but narrower than democratic security sector governance. It 
refers to the accountability of security policy and decision-makers – be they in the mili-
tary, police, governmental ministries, intelligence services or private security companies – 
to citizens (i.e. vertical accountability) and to other state institutions (i.e. horizontal 
accountability).  
Dimensions of democratic security sector governance 
Against this backdrop of terminological clarifications, the report will now advance a 
framework for the analysis of ‘democratic security sector governance’ that incorporates 
five basic dimensions: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, the rule of law, 
representativeness, and transparency. 
The first dimension of democratic security sector governance is horizontal account-
ability. According to Guillermo O’ Donnel, who coined the term, horizontal accountabil-
ity is “the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually 
willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or 
impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state 
that may be qualified as unlawful” (O’Donnell 1999: 60). Applied to the security sector, 
horizontal accountability refers to the ability of state institutions to control, manage, 
oversee and scrutinize security policy and decision-making processes, actors and 
institutions responsible for the application of the use of force. Horizontal accountability 
can be exercised through civilian executive control, parliamentary oversight, judicial 
review, and oversight by independent regulatory agencies.  
Vertical accountability of the security sector is the second dimension of democratic 
security sector governance and refers to the ability of civil society to influence, oversee 
and scrutinize the legitimate use of coercive force. Civil society is usually defined as being 
placed between the state and the market. It encompasses all voluntary associations and 
organizations which profess a public interest but do not intend to run for elections such 
as NGOs, syndicates, professional associations, social movements, educational 
institutions, faith-based communities, pressure groups, etc. According to a wider 
 
 
5  Samuel Huntington distinguished between the subjective and objective civilian control of the armed 
forces. “The essence of objective civilian control”, he argues, “is the recognition of autonomous military 
professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere” 
(Huntington 1967: 83). One special form of subjective control is politicization when civilians turn the 
security apparatus into a political instrument of the ruling regime or class. Since a certain level of 
politicization is unavoidable even in consolidated democracies, following Edmunds this report will use the 
term “partification” to describe “partisan cooption of security sector actors to a particular political party 
or personality”(Edmunds 2008: 26, 2007: 30). 
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definition, civil society is everything outside of the state and thus may also include the 
business community (Baker 2002). The basic form of vertical accountability is exercised 
through elections. But civil society needs to have the opportunity to be involved in 
security affairs beyond elections. It should conduct continuous oversight of policy-
making and implementation processes, create alternative sources of information and 
expertise and serve as a channel for steering different societal interests in the security 
sector (Caparini/Fluri 2006). Special attention should be paid to those organizations 
which are directly engaged in security affairs such as think tanks, research institutes and 
advocacy groups.  
The rule of law is the third dimension of the democratic governance of the security 
sector. Although the term rose to a status of orthodox acclaim within the western 
democratic discourse, due to its multiple meanings some authors claim it to be an 
“exceedingly elusive notion” or even an essentially contested one (Tamanaha 2004; 
Waldron 2002). According to a definition widely accepted in the literature, the rule of law 
exists “when the rules defining permitted and forbidden actions are not discretionary 
decisions of an individual, but rather take the form of laws that discipline every citizen, 
regardless of his or her power or status” (Smulovitz 2003: 168). Nevertheless, it is well 
known that laws can be general, mutually harmonized, equal for all and predictable but 
still not protect human rights and civil liberties. In order to encompass this moral 
dimension too, the formalist definition discussed above which equates the rule of law with 
the law state (German: Rechtsstaat) will have to be amended. Hence, we turn to Ronald 
Dworkin who claimed that the idea of the Rule of Law “assumes that citizens have moral 
rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights against the state as a 
whole. It insists that these moral and political rights be recognized in positive law […]” 
(Dworkin 1978: 262). By the same token, the rule of law in the security sector can be 
regarded as a function of two elements: the regulation of the sector in positive law, on the 
one hand, and the full respect of human rights and civil liberties by and within the 
security sector, on the other. 
The fourth dimension of democratic governance is the pursuit of equal representation 
of different social groups in the security sector. Representativeness is important both for 
the state’s strength in terms of its socio-political cohesion and for its overall democratic 
legitimacy. Different ethnic, religious or tribal communities should be represented as 
proportionally as possible in the security sector. Furthermore, women were traditionally 
excluded from participation in both decision and policy-making bodies and from security 
forces as such. In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on women in 
peace and security that recognized the hitherto neglected role that women can play in 
bringing peace and stability into the world. The resolution urged member states to 
“ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, 
regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, 
and resolution of conflict” (UNSC 2000: 2).  
The fifth dimension of democratic security governance is transparency. In the most 
general sense, “it means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those 
who will be affected by decisions or actions” (Hänggi 2003: 11). Still, it is unreasonable to 
6 Filip Ejdus 
 
 
expect the same level of transparency in the security sector as in the rest of the public 
sector. For instance, tactical and operational information in the possession of the police, 
military or intelligence service cannot always be made publicly available without 
jeopardizing the latter’s efficiency and effectiveness. However, the process of data 
classification needs to be well regulated in order to prevent arbitrariness and a tendency 
towards bureaucracy, which is found all too often in the security sector as a way of hiding 
from accountability behind a wall of secrecy and alleged national security interests. By the 
same token, under no circumstances should citizens be denied the right to receive 
accurate and timely information about the general assessment and strategy when it comes 
to national security issues (Ekovich 2009). In addition, statutory actors in the security 
sector should make their spending transparent so that both other state organs and citizens 
can hold them accountable. 
So far, we have developed a framework for the analysis of what democratic security 
sector governance represents (table 1). In the following chapter, the report will firstly 
discuss the context of reform and then apply this analytical framework to the case study of 
Serbia. 
 
1. Horizontal 
accountability  
2. Vertical 
accountability  
3. Rule of 
Law 
4. Representation 5. Transparency 
Executive 
civilian control 
Elections  Rechtsstaat  Ethnic 
representation 
General 
transparency 
Parliamentary 
control 
Alternative 
expertise 
Judicial review  Policy evaluation Human 
rights and 
civil liberties 
 
Gender 
representation 
 
Financial 
transparency 
Oversight of 
independent 
bodies 
Public oversight 
 
Table 1: Dimensions of democratic security sector governance 
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3.  Context of democratization and security sector reform in Serbia 
3.1  Democratization and security sector reform 
The President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, recently described the democratic transition in 
Serbia since 5 October 2000 as “the highest level of democratic progress in the country’s 
history” (Dedeić 2010: 2). Serbia has had several rounds of free and fair elections and 
peaceful transfers of power over the past decade. Yet, it still has to pass the “two turnover 
test”, or the question of whether the old elites that ruled prior to democratization will be 
prepared to transfer power peacefully after their next comeback (Huntington 1991: 266). 
Nonetheless, the return of autocracy is highly unlikely, since the political parties that 
ruled Serbia during the 1990s have mostly abandoned the reactionary discourse and 
embraced the democratic rules of the game and the goal of EU membership.6 
Nevertheless, ten years after the democratic changes, Serbia is still not a consolidated 
or full democracy, but rather an under-consolidated or flawed democracy.7 Political parties 
are stronger than state institutions, while the executive power still dominates over the 
legislative and judicial branches. As Timothy Edmunds argues, despite democratic 
reforms, “illiberal interests, actors and networks of governance have found new ways to 
adapt, survive and even thrive” (Edmunds 2009: 129). These informal networks, 
corruption, clientelism and illiberal political culture may not necessarily jeopardize the 
newly established democratic rules of the game but can prevent them from being 
institutionalized and consolidated.  
Compared with the 1990s, the overall security environment in Serbia became 
stabilized after 2000 with two exceptions. The first was a lingering conflict between 
Serbian security forces and Albanian insurgents in South Serbia. The conflict came to an 
end in May 2001 when the Končulj peace agreement was brokered with the help of the 
international community. The second exception was the assassination of Prime Minister 
Zoran Đinđić in an attempted coup d'état conspired by the Special Operations Unit (JSO), 
the State Security Agency (RDB) and the Zemun clan (organized crime group) in March 
2003. The state responded by declaring a state of emergency and launching police 
Operation Sabre. In the course of this operation, which lasted for 40 days, more than 
 
 
6  The first shift occurred when Slobodan Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) led by pragmatic Ivica 
Dačić supported the minority government of Vojislav Koštunica in 2004. The SPS has been part of the 
current government of Mirko Cvetković since its formation in 2008 and is controlling some of the major 
ministries such as internal affairs, infrastructure, energy and education. The second shift occurred in 2008 
when the top leadership of the ultra nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) decided to split and form a 
centre-right Serbian Progress Party (SNS).  
7  Serbian political scientists Dušan Pavlović and Slobodan Antonić coined the term under-consolidated 
democracy (Pavlović/Antonić 2007). According to the Economist’s Index of Democracy, Serbia ranked 
62nd and fell under the category of a flawed democracy. Available at: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/ 
Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf (13.9.2010). 
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10,000 people were apprehended among whom, apart from criminals, were also high 
officials from the security and judicial sector, politicians from opposition parties, 
journalists, lawyers, and even pop stars. In spite of some dire prognosis, Serbia reacted 
peacefully both to the separation of Montenegro in May 2006 and to the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008.  
All the Serbian governments formed since 2000 have proclaimed security sector 
reform as one of their top priorities. In practice, per contra, their deeds have not always 
matched their words. Defence reforms only gained momentum after the dysfunctional 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) dissolved in 2006 and when each republic 
assumed responsibility for its own military. The looming unilateral declaration of 
independence of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo provoked the 
Serbian National Assembly to declare military neutrality in December 2007, thus halting 
the future integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.8 The Serbian Armed Forces 
(SAF) increased their participation in peacekeeping operations, although it is still modest 
in comparison to other countries in the region. Moreover, mechanisms for the democratic 
control of the armed forces have been established. Lastly, full professionalization and the 
abandonment of obligatory military service (announced in 2006) will be accomplished by 
2010.  
Police reforms, which were blocked by the protracted constitutional limbo of the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, started shortly after the democratic changes. These 
changes were at first symbolical and encompassed the introduction of new police 
uniforms to replace the old camouflage ones, international re-integration and a gradual 
opening to civil society. An important reorganization step was the detachment of the 
secret service from the Ministry of Interior (MUP) and the establishment of a separate 
Security Information Agency (BIA) in 2002. Initially, the police reforms were not 
systematic but unfolded without any coherent plan or strategy (Stojanović 2007/8). By 
and large, their pace and direction were dictated by the poorly harmonized priorities of 
the international donor community. The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in 
2003 moved police reforms up the political agenda and certain structural reforms soon 
started to take place. In the following years capacities for criminal investigation were 
strengthened at the expense of the uniformed police. The police ceased to be a repressive 
apparatus and became a service of the citizens, and a new normative framework was 
established (Stojanović 2007). Likewise, the intelligence reforms have been partial and 
incomplete.9 The enthusiasm of the oppositional political parties for investigating the 
involvement of intelligence services in violations of human rights and for opening secret 
dossiers waned soon after they came to power. On a more positive side, a new normative 
 
 
8  Resolution of the National Assembly on the Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and 
Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia, adopted on 26 December 2007. 
9  Currently Serbia has three intelligence services; one civilian, the Security Information Service (BIA), and 
two military, the Military Intelligence Service (VOA) and the Military Security Agency (VBA). 
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framework was adopted and the intelligence services were put, at least formally, under 
democratic civilian control.  
Lastly, one cannot discuss the security sector in Serbia without taking private security 
companies into consideration. Although the first such companies (mostly detective 
agencies) started to emerge in the early 1980s, the first real boom occurred during the 
1990s. State collapse, armed conflict and international economic sanctions opened up 
space for the rise of private security. The three most important clients of the private 
security sector at the time were (1) “economic entrepreneurs” who may not have been 
able to obtain police protection for their ‘grey economy’ activities; (2) opposition political 
parties threatened by the state security apparatus and (3) organized criminal groups. The 
privatization of security was given an additional boost following the democratic changes 
in 2000. The downsizing of the Serbian police and military resulted in a huge number of 
people prepared to offer their experience cheaply on the market. In parallel to this, a small 
number of companies emerged and organized themselves in an Association of Companies 
for Physical and Technical Security, which was established in 2005. According to some 
estimates, there are currently around 3,000 private security companies in Serbia, which 
employ around 30,000 people and possess up to 47,000 pieces of arms (Unijat et al. 2008: 
48; Hadžić et al. 2009: 333). They offer all possible services ranging from body guarding to 
private intelligence work with the sole exception of providing private military services. 
However, in spite of its size, the private security sector has been completely ignored by 
political decision-makers and has so far been left to market forces.  
3.2  Obstacle to reforms 
Both democratization and security sector reform in Serbia have been facing a set of 
structural, institutional and ideological obstacles. The first structural obstacle that 
significantly impaired democratic security sector reforms were the unresolved questions 
of statehood such as the armed rebellion in South Serbia (2000-2001), the uncertain 
relationship with Montenegro (until 2006) and the unresolved final status of Kosovo, 
which unilaterally declared its independence in February 2008. For example, following 5 
October 2000, the crisis in South Serbia served as the pretext for the then President of 
Yugoslavia, Vojislav Koštunica, not replacing the Chief of Staff Nebojša Pavković and the 
Head of the State Security Agency Radomir Marković.  
The second structural obstacle was the fractured political scene, which prevented the 
emergence of political consensus and clear political visions (Edmunds 2007: 84). The 
political scene was fragmented both between republics (until 2006) and within them. For 
example, the first democratic government in Serbia was run by a coalition of 18 political 
parties and was paralyzed by bitter rivalry between the two strongest ones – Zoran 
Đinđić’s Democratic Party (DS) and Vojislav Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS). This blocked the formation of a national consensus on any of the key political 
challenges of the time such as security sector reform, cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague (ICTY), Euro-Atlantic 
integration, the future of the federation with Montenegro and policy vis-à-vis Kosovo. 
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The third and the final structural obstacle to the democratization of the security sector 
in Serbia has been the lack of strong incentives from the international environment. 
While NATO integration drove security sector reforms in the case of other CEE 
countries, there was no such impetus in the case of Serbia since the country proclaimed 
military neutrality. International organizations like the OSCE, UNDP and DCAF as well 
as many Western states provided significant assistance to security sector reform on a 
bilateral level in the form of education, expertise, training and funding (Edmunds 2007: 
213-234). Nevertheless, it was only the EU which really had a leverage to push for certain 
aspects of reform through its conditionality policy. This has been amply demonstrated by 
effective reforms related to the visa liberalization regime, which entered into force on 1 
January 2010. Nevertheless, the EU has so far not paid sufficient attention to the 
democratization of security sector governance. This subject has received only marginal 
attention in the annual progress reports published by the European Commission and the 
focus has mostly been on the adoption of various legislation measures (Abusara 2009). 
Such a ‘ticking the box’ approach has in fact moved the legislative agenda in Serbia, but it 
has been completely ineffective when it comes to the problems of implementation.  
In addition to this, we can identify two institutional obstacles that have constrained 
the democratization of the security sector in Serbia. The first institutional obstacle is the 
historical legacy carried within the security sector institutions themselves. Generally 
speaking, institutions in the security sector of Serbia are burdened with two parallel 
legacies: The first is an authoritarian legacy dating from both the communist (1945-1991) 
and the nationalist (1991-2000) eras. The second is a more recent legacy from armed 
conflicts as Serbia’s security sector has directly or indirectly been one of the main 
protagonists in five armed conflicts: Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-1995), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1992-1995), Kosovo (1998-1999) and South Serbia (2000-2001). Both 
legacies, though each in its own way, have left a strong organizational and normative 
imprint on the security sector institutions (Edmunds 2007: 89, 2008: 41). On the one 
hand, the authoritarian legacy is characterized by the repressive and secretive organi-
zational culture, the clientelist relationship with the civilian authorities and an entrenched 
belief in a privileged status among other branches of the public administration. On the 
other hand, the legacy from the Yugoslav wars encompasses militarization, wartime 
connections with organized crime, and involvement in war crimes. The fact that Serbia 
lost all the wars could have been a mitigating circumstance for a fast, comprehensive 
reform following 5 October 2000. However, no advantage was taken of this mitigating 
circumstance because the new political elites did not have enough courage to face citizens 
with this bitter reality. 
The second institutional obstacle was the very pacted nature of the democratic 
transition in Serbia. The peaceful transfer of power in October 2000 was made possible by 
pacting the top security sector leadership into the new democratic regime. While Vojislav 
Koštunica, the new President, co-opted Chief of General Staff Nebojša Pavković, Zoran 
Đinđić, the future Prime Minister, struck a deal with Milorad Luković Legija, commander 
of the Special Operations Unit (JSO). Although this may have prevented bloodshed on the 
streets of Belgrade, it also hindered a swift security sector reform. After the introduction 
of democratic changes, the new political elites did not make a decisive break with the past 
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but rather decided to co-opt its top management and reform these institutions in a 
piecemeal way. This enabled the old institutions (police, military, secret services, etc.) to 
continue their path-dependent life and conduct business-as-usual under the new 
democratic system.  
Finally, the establishment of democratic security sector governance in Serbia faced one 
important ideological obstacle. Ever since the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbian polity 
has been deeply divided between national-liberational and civic-democratic discourses, 
commonly referred to as “the two Serbias”. While the former draws on the narratives 
about the ‘external liberation’ from foreign powers, the latter builds on narratives about 
the ‘internal liberation’ or social emancipation. These two discursive orders, which largely 
came into existence in their current form during the 1990s, are producing divergent 
conceptions of collective identity and national interests, but also two different images of 
what the security sector and security policies should look like (Ejdus 2010). On the one 
hand, the national-liberational discourse constructs the national self in ethnic and spatial 
terms (as opposed to territorial ‘Others’) while its representations of dangers are related to 
the external realm. Consequently, the security sector, especially the military, should be 
developed primarily for the defence of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. The 
civic-democratic discourse constructs national identity not only in civic spatial terms but 
also in temporal terms (as opposed to the past ‘Self’). Its dominant security concerns are 
related to internal affairs such as crime, corruption and right-wing extremism. 
Consequently, the military should be decreased in size, professionalized and adapted to 
the new missions. 
This ideological struggle between the first and the second Serbia prevented the 
creation of national consensus, but on a deeper level than the fragmentation of the 
political scene. The absence of consensus, in this ideational account, is not a function of 
fracturing the political scene into many small actors each with their own interests and 
ideas about the future of Serbia, but of a deep symbolic rift within the Serbian polity. 
Against this backdrop, we now turn to the analysis of democratic security sector 
governance in Serbia using the conceptual framework developed in the first part of the 
report. 
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4.  Democratic security sector governance in Serbia 2000-2010 
4.1 Horizontal accountability  
Over the past decade, Serbia has, for the first time in its history, established institutional 
mechanisms for horizontal accountability. Intelligence services and the Serbian Armed 
Forces were nominally put under democratic civilian control in 2002 and 2003 
respectively.10 The new Constitution adopted in 2006 as well as all other subsequent 
security and defence laws contain similar provisions.  
Executive civilian control 
Control by executive civilian authorities is the first form of horizontal accountability.11 In 
the main, the military was under the control of civilian executive authorities throughout 
the 1990s, albeit authorities without democratic legitimacy. Moreover, this was rather a 
subjective type of control due to the high level of partification and instrumentalization of 
the security apparatus for the purpose of regime survival. When Milošević’s regime 
collapsed, the armed forces regained a degree of professional autonomy and new laws 
were adopted regulating civilian supremacy in the chain of command. The General Staff 
was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 2004, while the President of Serbia 
acquired the title of supreme military commander from the Supreme Defence Council in 
2006.12  
Another important step in the development of the civilian chain of command was the 
establishment of the National Security Council. Since it could not be established at the 
federal level due to deep political rifts, the Government of Serbia established its own State 
Security Council in 2002. Formally, this body was nevertheless not authorized to control 
the Military of Yugoslavia (VJ), including its two intelligence services (Military Security 
Service and Military Intelligence Service), as well as two intelligence services attached to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Security Service and Service for Research and 
Documentation). As the assassination of the Prime Minister in March 2003 proved, the 
Council was not able to control security institutions that were formally in its remit. The 
government of Serbia re-established the National Security Council in 2006 with formal 
competence to control and coordinate all five intelligence services and with the main goal 
of completing cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY), that is the arresting and extraditing the remaining 
 
 
10  Law on Security Services of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2002); The Constitutional Charter of the State 
Union Serbia and Montenegro (2003). 
11  We prefer the term executive civilian control to the term civilian control because it is more precise and 
enables a clear delineation from parliamentary oversight and judicial review which are also forms of 
control by civilian authorities. 
12  The Supreme Defence Council was the body at the State Union level which ceased to exist after its 
dissolution in 2006. 
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indictees to the Hague. This body, which was supposed to be co-presided by the President 
and the Prime Minister, has never met since President Boris Tadić did not want to share 
this position with then Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica. In the meantime, the 
Constitution of Serbia was adopted but it failed to mention this body since there was no 
political agreement over who would be its chair. The deal over its composition was struck 
in May 2007 after the new government was formed. Following the elections, the balance 
of political power tilted in favour of President Tadić and his Democratic Party so that he 
formally assumed the entitlement to chair the Council.13  
In December 2008, the system of civilian control was put to the test when Chief of Staff 
Zdravko Ponoš publicly accused Minister of Defence Dragan Šutanovac of violating 
professional military autonomy and of meddling with the operational management of the 
armed forces.14 The dispute was resolved by the President and supreme military 
commander Boris Tadić, who dismissed the Chief of Staff for violating military rules and 
breaching the civilian chain of command. Although this case demonstrated the 
effectiveness of executive civilian control, it also revealed its deeply subjective character. 
An executive civilian control of the military intelligence services was almost inexistent 
until recently. Although their operations were traditionally hidden behind a cloud of 
secrecy, over the past decade these services were under the spotlight in numerous public 
scandals, including unauthorized surveillance, mysterious deaths of soldiers and 
speculations about the support of persons indicted for war crimes. Minister of Defence 
Dragan Šutanovac even admitted in July 2009 that “there is not a single way, not a single 
instrument at the minister’s disposal to obtain information about what is really going on in 
these agencies” (Jovanović 2009: 2). Shortly after, the institution of Inspector General was 
formally introduced into the legal system as the mechanism of internal control.15 However, 
since nobody has been appointed to the post it has yet to be implemented in practice.16 
In contrast to the military intelligence services, which are organizational units within 
the Ministry of Defence, the Security Information Agency, which is a civilian intelligence 
service, is a separate agency. The director of the Agency is appointed by the government, 
which holds him accountable. The agency reports to the government twice a year and has 
to comply with general guidelines set by the government. Nevertheless, the Security 
Information Agency is under strong political influence. The question of which political 
 
 
13  The National Security Council is composed of the President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defence, Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, Chief of General Staff and directors of intelligence 
services. Interestingly enough, the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as representatives of the Assembly 
do not participate in the work of the Council. Source: Law on the Basic Organization of the Security and 
Intelligence System of the Republic of Serbia, adopted in December 2007. 
14  He also criticized the MoD for failure to devise defence policy and for irresponsible procurement. 
15  The Law on VOA and VBA, articles pp. 54-56 
16  According to the Law, the Inspector General, who is recommended by the Minister of Defence, is 
appointed by the Government for a period of five years.  
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party will gain control over the agency remains one of the most important topics of all 
coalition discussions. All past directors were loyal party henchmen rather than 
independent professionals, which enabled the ‘partification’ of the Security Information 
Agency’s operations. The best case in point is the arrest of war crime suspect Radovan 
Karadžić only four days after the change of the Agency’s Director on 17 July 2008. This 
leaves little doubt that the Security Information Agency had already known his 
whereabouts for some time but did not apprehend him due to the lack of political will 
within the Democratic Party of Serbia that had a grip on the Agency.17 On the other hand, 
many believe that the Security Information Agency still exerts strong influence on 
democratically elected politicians. For example, there is often talk about “the register” of 
the Security Information Agency's informers which mysteriously disappeared in the 
months following 5 October 2000. It allegedly contained incriminating information about 
many politicians from the democratic opposition at the time.18 A former Security 
Information Agency official, Zoran Stijović, even says that “hope, faith and future of our 
citizens were at one point entrusted to people who could have been blackmailed by the 
Service. Once the pillar of the ancien régime and wallowing in crime and corruption, the 
Service did many things in its own right and for its own interests” (Pejović 2009: 12). 
As far as the police are concerned, basic political and legal preconditions for de-
politicization and executive civilian control have been met since 2000. The Law on Police, 
which was adopted in 2005, distinguished operational/organizational components from 
political and supervisory ones. This was supposed to reduce the meddling of politicians in 
the operational management of the police. Some competences of the Minister of Interior 
are still too extensive (e.g. the right to appoint heads of regional police directorates, the 
discretionary use of special forces, total command over internal control, etc.). In the past, 
political changes at the top of the Ministry of Interior were by default followed by a purge 
of politically unfit policemen at high and mid levels. The biggest purge so far took place in 
2004 when most of the members of staff involved in Operation Sabre were sacked.19 
According to the latest public opinion poll on police reforms, 84% of citizens believe that 
politicians exert too strong an influence over operational police activities (SMMRI 2008: 
18). According to the same poll, most people believe that the police are often used to 
 
 
17  According to some unverified sources, it was the outgoing head of BIA Rade Bulatović who actually 
decided to arrest Karadžić either because he was trying to undermine the recently signed post-election 
coalition agreement between SPS and DS (on 4 July) or because he wanted to secure certain benefits from 
the incoming government. 
18  The head of the State Security Service (RDB) Radomir Marković, one of Milošević’s closest cronies, 
managed to stay in his position until January 2001. This provided him with enough time to possibly 
‘clean’ the incriminating evidence. In 2005, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for numerous state-
sponsored assassinations. The verdict was altered to 40 years of imprisonment in 2008. 
19  The current Minister Ivica Dačić took office in 2008. He merely replaced the Head of the Service for the 
Fight against Organized Crime and promised that the times of political purges in the Ministry are over. 
Whether this will be the case remains to be seen (Veljković 2010: 14).  
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protect the interests of the government (75%) and political parties (66%) while only 36% 
believe that the police work in the interest of the citizens. 
Parliamentary control 
Parliamentary control is the other form of horizontal accountability, albeit poorly 
practiced in Serbia. To start with, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 
traditionally occupies a weak position in the political system, especially vis-à-vis the 
executive branch. During the first three years of transition (2000-2003), the executive had 
a complete legislative monopoly; disobedient members of parliament were deprived of 
mandates while parliamentary rules and regulations were often violated (Pavlović/ 
Antonić 2007: 91-97). The situation improved with the new composition of the National 
Assembly in 2004 and especially after the new Constitution was adopted in 2006, 
strengthening parliamentary prerogatives.20 Nevertheless, its Article 102 stipulates that 
MPs can voluntarily sign blank resignations which can be activated by their political 
parties at any time. This reinforced the domination of political parties and executive 
power over MPs and the legislative power in general. On a more positive note, the formal 
competences of the parliamentary Defence and Security Committee are quite extensive.  
Unfortunately, parliamentary control is still quite modest in practice because the 
Committee does not have either the capacities or the will to use its competences. So far, its 
role has boiled down to routine meetings, the adoption of reports submitted by the 
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence and intelligence services, as well as to 
discussions about mundane political affairs. Proposals of legal acts in the field of security 
and defence have most often been adopted in emergency procedures without any 
thorough discussion either in the committee or in plenary sessions.21 Most worryingly, 
the Defence and Security Committee has so far not exercised its probably most powerful 
weapon, namely budgetary control or so called ‘purse power’. Parliamentary control of 
the intelligence sector is limited to discussions and the adoption of its periodic reports. 
Members of the Committee have made very few field control visits to the intelligence 
services. Traditionally, the Chair of the Committee has been a representative of the 
strongest opposition party.  
In March 2010, a decision was made to abandon this practice because, as one of the 
MPs from the ruling coalition argued, “the opposition did everything but what it had to 
 
 
20  The right to interpellation was introduced while the confidence motion was better regulated.  
21  For example, a set of security and defence laws was put into parliamentary procedure at the beginning of 
December 2007. On 3 December, the Defence and Security Committee started its first session which was 
supposed to consider the laws at 9:20 am. However, the plenary session of the Assembly with the same bills 
on the agenda began on the same day at 10:00 am. The Committee met only once more on 5 December 
before the laws were adopted on 11 December. The reason behind such an emergency procedure was the 
Law on Implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (2006). The law stipulated that security 
and defence laws should be adopted at the latest within a year from the day the constitution was adopted, 
which was also a precondition for the announcement of the presidential elections.  
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do, exercise democratic civilian control of the security sector” (Stanković 2010: 3). Finally, 
the new parliamentary rules of procedure adopted in July 2010 stipulated the breakdown 
of the Defence and Security Committee into the Committee for Defence and Internal 
Affairs and the Committee for Security Services. This move should be able to increase the 
human, material and time resources of the National Assembly and hence improve 
parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Still, certain parts of this sector, such as 
private security firms, customs administration, prison guards, the administration for the 
prevention of money laundering, and the tax police remain by and large outside 
parliamentary control. 
Judicial review 
The third form of horizontal accountability is judicial review, which is about the control 
of the legality of operations, especially concerning respect for the human rights of 
ordinary citizens and security sector employees alike. On the positive side, the formal 
preconditions for the judicial review of the security sector have been in place in Serbia 
over the last decade (Mirčić 2008). Military courts were abolished in 2004 and their 
mandate and responsibilities were transferred to civilian courts. In most cases, judicial 
review in the military domain refers to administrative disputes regarding soldiers’ rights 
and duties. Military Disciplinary Courts, formed within the Serbian Armed Forces and 
the Ministry of Defence, are responsible for dealing with the disciplinary transgressions of 
professional soldiers, including those related to human rights. When it comes to police 
and intelligence services, the judicial review is mainly about the control of the legality of 
the use of force and special investigative measures. According to article 41 of the 
Constitution, state institutions are obliged to seek the courts’ permission in order to 
conduct secret surveillance. However, the Law on Electronic Communication that was 
adopted in 2010 allows certain infringements of privacy without explicit permission from 
a court. This was heavily criticized as unconstitutional (Janković 2010). 
Although it is formally established, in practice the judicial review still suffers from a 
range of shortcomings. First, courts are over burdened, slow and do not have sufficient 
capacity to function normally. For example, since they lack the capacity to keep private 
data which has been collected secretly, such data is left within the Ministry of Interior. 
Second, the executive power is still exerting excessive pressure on the judiciary, especially 
on the public prosecution authorities. It has been quite passive in filing complaints 
against policemen suspected of the disproportional use of force against citizens and the 
violation of human rights (Ilić 2010: 14). Finally, there are clear indications that 
prosecution is still strongly influenced by the executive. A case in point is an incident 
involving six youngsters who threw a Molotov cocktail at the Greek Embassy in August 
2009 out of solidarity with Greek anarchists. Although the damage they caused was 
estimated at just 18 Euro, they were still charged with international terrorism and faced 
an unfair trial raising serious doubts about the political background to the trial (Pešić 
2010: 7). Another example is the case of the controversial arrest of Milorad Ulemek 
Legija, who turned himself in in May 2004. Two years later, one opposition party initiated 
criminal charges against the then Minister of Interior Dragan Jočić and the Director of 
Security Information Agency Rade Bulatović for forging the official record of 
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conversations that they had with Legija on the night of his arrest; but the investigation 
was soon dropped. The prosecutor responsible for the case, Zoran Jakovljević, revealed in 
2010 that this step was directly ordered by the Ministry of Interior.22  
Oversight of independent regulatory agencies 
The last but not the least important form of horizontal accountability is the oversight 
conducted by independent regulatory agencies. During the last decade, a number of 
independent regulatory agencies have been established such as the Ombudsperson, the 
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection (the 
Commissioner), the Anti-Corruption Agency and the State Audit Institution. The 
Ombudsperson is responsible for the protection of human rights and civil liberties and 
conducts oversight of public institutions in this respect. Apart from his regular activities 
monitoring respect for human rights by the security apparatus, the Ombudsperson also 
conducted his first “preventive-control” field visit to the Security Information Agency in 
January/February 2010.23 The Commissioner exercises public oversight in the domain of 
access to information and private data protection. He regularly responds to citizens’ 
demands and can make binding decisions. The State Audit Institution has so far not 
controlled institutions within the security sector, although it has the formal authority to 
do so. 
From day one of their existence, all these independent regulatory agencies faced 
tremendous obstacles ranging from the lack of minimal material preconditions for their 
work to complete ignorance of their decisions by other governmental institutions. The 
Commissioner recently warned that “decisions of the government to establish these 
institutions should not serve as a façade just because the EU wants them. However, it is 
not a rare occasion in Serbia that the institutions which are meant to exercise control are 
facing enormous problems” (Janičijević 2010: 20). 
4.2 Vertical accountability 
Security sector reform has not been among the top issues in Serbian elections. These have 
been dominated by economic, social and political concerns (Atanasović 2007). According 
to the opinion polls, the military in Serbia has traditionally enjoyed strong public support. 
During the Milošević rule, public support for the military seemed to correspond positively 
to the perceived intensity of the external threat and varied between 43% in 1997 and 83% 
in 2000 (Hadžić/Timotić 2006: 97). This support started to decrease, however, after the 
 
 
22  Source: www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=09&dd=02&nav_id=69451 (21.9.2010).  
23  His conclusion was that the BIA fully conforms to legal provisions about using special investigative 
measures. The report is available on: www.ombudsman.rs/index.php/lang-sr/izvestaji/posebnii-izvestaji/ 
791-2010-03-13-14-29-30 (30.8.2010). 
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democratic changes (Ibid: 98).24 This tendency only began to reverse in 2009, which is 
seen clearly both in public opinion polls and in the increasing number of applications of 
prospective cadets for places at the Military Academy.25 In contrast to the military, the 
police by and large lost the public’s support during the 1990s due to their strong political 
instrumentalization and repressive methods of operation. Public support for the police 
began to rise again after 2000 and especially during Operation Sabre in the spring of 
2003.26 In the following years, although the legitimacy of the democratic institutions in 
general was plummeting, the police remained one of the most popular institutions, after 
the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Armed Forces. To our knowledge, no 
surveys of public support for the intelligence agencies have been conducted to date.  
When it comes to active participation by civil society, the picture is improving but is 
still far from perfect. During the rule of Slobodan Milošević, the CSOs were regarded as 
the “fifth column”, especially if they dealt with security and defence issues. Following 5 
October 2000, these organizations were elevated to the status of a “necessary evil”, or 
unavoidable nuisance that needs to be tolerated for the sake of minimum democratic 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, the security apparatus still does not regard civil society as a 
partner but rather as a challenge if not a threat (Ejdus 2009). At best, they consider NGOs 
as a source of democratic legitimacy but not yet as a source of independent expertise or 
democratic oversight. To make things worse, even the public at large is sceptical about the 
role of NGOs. For example, according to one poll in 2006, 47 % of citizens had negative 
associations regarding NGOs.27  
On the positive side, the number of NGOs interested in security affairs has increased 
significantly in the past decade, although most of them are located in Belgrade. This 
development has been followed by an increase in their capacities for public oversight and 
participation (CCMR 2008). The legal status of NGOs is regulated by the Law on Citizens’ 
Associations adopted in 2009. So far, these organizations have been funded mostly by 
international donations through bilateral financial assistance from Western countries, 
foreign private foundations or through multilateral organizations. The most important 
role that civil society has so far played was to influence the legislative process. Some of the 
success stories in that respect have been the legislation on the right of conscientious 
objection, the right of free access to information, private data protection, classification of 
data, etc. The Ministry of Defence opened the public discussion about legislation in the 
 
 
24  72.8% in June 2003, 57% in April 2004, 40.8% in April 2005. 
25  In 2004 only 21 candidates applied for 240 places at the Military Academy while 1259 candidates applied 
in 2010. 
26  According to a survey conducted by Medijum Galup in April 2003, 50% of citizens had confidence in the 
police (Bjelovuk 2003:6). According to a survey conducted by CESID, public confidence in the police was 
44% in 2005 (Jevtović 2005: 5). 
27  See: www.smartkolektiv.org (30.8.2010). Similar results were reached in a longitudinal survey of public 
support for NGOs conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences. www.idn.org.rs (30.8.2010). 
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defence field for the first time in 2007 and this has become the usual practice ever since. 
Recently, some political parties are also slowly beginning to recognize the usefulness of 
independent expertise within NGOs. For example, in October 2009 the opposition Liberal 
Democratic Party contacted the independent think tank Centre for Civil-Military 
Relations for an opinion on a set of draft security and defence laws which were 
undergoing parliamentary proceedings at the time. 
4.3 The rule of law 
Significant progress has also been made regarding the rule of law. The new Constitution was 
adopted in 2006 together with key legislation in the field of defence and security.28 In 2009, 
the Serbian Parliament adopted the first National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy 
that, among other things, confirmed the values of democratic civilian control, 
professionalization, the rule of law, civil society participation, and transparency. 
Additionally, for the first time intelligence services were regulated by laws and not by secret 
governmental decrees and directives. Nevertheless, the legislation was adopted without a 
systematic plan and is not fully harmonized either horizontally or vis-à-vis the Constitution. 
Finally, Serbia remains the only country in South East Europe without a comprehensive law 
on the private security sector, which is still extremely under-regulated.29 
Principles of human rights and civil liberties have been duly incorporated into the new 
normative framework. Regarding defence laws, the right of conscientious objection and 
alternative civilian service were introduced in 2003. In addition, the new Law on the 
Serbian Armed Forces, adopted in 2007, recognized the right of professional soldiers to 
form military trade unions, their freedom of worship as well as the right to access 
information. However, its article 14a bans them from participation in any activities 
organized by CSOs dealing with security and defence issues. This not only jeopardizes 
public oversight and civic participation in security and defence policies but is also an 
infringement of the constitutional freedom of association.  
The new normative framework regulating police affairs was also harmonized with 
international human rights standards. The Law on Police (2005) established the Service of 
Internal Control responsible for the control of the legality of police work especially “with 
 
 
28  Some of the key legislation is: Law on Security-Intelligence Agency (2002); Law on Police (2005); Law on 
the Serbian Armed Forces (2007); Law on Defence (2007); Law on the Basic Organization of the Security 
and Intelligence System of the Republic of Serbia (2007); Law on Private Data Protection (2008); Law on 
Civilian Service (2009); Law on Participation of the Serbian Armed Forces and Other Defence Forces in 
Multinational Operations Outside the Borders of the Republic of Serbia (2009); Law on the Military 
Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency (2009); Defence Strategy (2009); National Security 
Strategy (2009); Law on Data Secrecy (2009). 
29  Nonetheless, the private security sector does not exist in a total legal vacuum. There is a huge number of 
more general laws and subordinate legislation that regulate certain aspects of their work.  
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regard to the protection of human rights in the execution of police tasks and 
implementation of police mandates”.30 The new Code of Ethics, adopted in 2003 in 
accordance with the European Code of Police Ethics, set the guidelines for the protection of 
human rights.31 Intelligence services too are obliged to base their activities on respect for 
human rights and civil liberties. Members of military intelligence services can complain to 
the Inspector General should they have information about human rights violations.32  
On the other hand, the new regulation covering the secret collection of private data 
has certain deficiencies from the human rights perspective. In addition to the Law on 
Electronic Communication already mentioned, one should also mention the Law on the 
Security Information Agency and the Law on Criminal Procedure which avoid obliging 
public institutions that collect private data to inform the individuals concerned, as is 
stipulated by Article 42 of the Constitution. Finally, the Law on the Security Information 
Agency does not stipulate the existence of internal controls that could hold employees of 
the Security Information Agency accountable for a potential violation of human rights. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to know to what extent the above-depicted normative 
framework guaranteeing human rights is being implemented in practice. Reports by the 
military-disciplinary courts to the President and Minister of Defence are not available 
publicly. A military trade union has still not been established. As one Major from the 
Serbian Armed Forces explains: “No one wants to have his career tarnished [...] everyone 
would rather have others do it. This right exists only on paper but doesn’t work in 
practice”.33 Moreover, the introduction of religious service in the military was announced 
for 2010. Serbia does not have a military ombudsperson, but if the human rights of 
soldiers are violated in any way by a state institution, he/she is entitled to bring his/her 
grievance to the attention of the civilian ombudsperson. It is indicative that the number of 
complaints filed against the Ministry of Defence is small by proportion.34 There is still no 
definitive proof that the human rights of soldiers are fully respected. As another military 
officer put it: “Formally, there are mechanisms for the protection of our human rights. 
The problem is that we don’t use these mechanisms because we are trained to endure. 
That’s the essence of the problem”.35 Finally, there is reason to believe that the problem of 
mobbing, workplace bullying by superiors, is widespread within the Serbian Armed 
Forces, especially within units. As one senior military officer put it: “Mobbing is difficult 
to prove and it is usually silenced in an organization that hinges on hierarchy. Victims 
 
 
30  Article 172 of the Law on Police. 
31  The new Code of Police Ethics was adopted in 2006. 
32  Article 51 of the Law on the Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency. 
33  Anonymous interviews conducted at the Military Academy in December 2009. 
34  In 2007, 2008 and 2009 only 5, 26 and 23 complaints against the MoD were filed which was 1.23%, 2.52% 
and 1.22% (respectively) of the total number of complaints filed. 
35  Anonymous interviews conducted at the Military Academy in December 2009. 
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would rather suffer and wait for a new boss than lose a few years of their career in efforts 
to prove they are right”.36 
Police torture and the disproportionate use of force are not occurring on the 
systematic level that was the case during the 1990s but instances still do occur. This has 
been highlighted both by local NGOs and international organizations such as the Council 
of Europe.37  
What is more, cases of police torture and inhumane treatment are rarely investigated, 
and even more rarely prosecuted. When it comes to the intelligence services, the biggest 
challenge is the practical implementation of the human rights regulation concerning 
private data protection. The Commissioner for Public Information estimates that there 
are around 300,000 actors in the state, including intelligence services, who hold about a 
million different kinds of records, usually without any legal basis and without the 
approval of the individuals concerned (Šabić 2010).  
4.4 Representativeness 
The fourth dimension of democratic security sector governance is representativeness or 
the pursuit of the equal representation of different social groups within the security 
sector. In terms of ethnic representativeness, things improved during the last decade. 
According to the latest census conducted in 2002, Serbs accounted for 82.8%, Hungarians 
3.9%, Bosnians 1.82%, Roma 1.44%, Yugoslavs 1%38 while all the other groups together 
comprised 9.7% of the population in Serbia (without Kosovo).39 However, the ethnic 
composition of the security sector does not reflect this diversity. During the nineties, the 
Military of Yugoslavia (VJ), which was a successor to the multiethnic Yugoslav People’s 
Army (JNA), became almost purely Serbian. The situation has not improved much after a 
decade of democratic transition. According to data from 2008, 91.2% soldiers in the 
Serbian Armed Forces declared themselves to be Serbs (Hadžić et al. 2009: 147). Over the 
past couple of years, the Military Academy had virtually no cadets at all belonging to 
ethnic minority communities. This situation has begun to change in 2010. According to 
the Minister of Defence, “after many years a great number of national minorities will 
enrol at the Military Academy” (Didanović 2010: 12).  
 
 
36  Anonymous interviews conducted at the Military Academy in December 2009. 
37  For local NGO accounts, see annual Human Rights Reports published by the Belgrade Centre for Human 
Rights available at: www.english.bgcentar.org.rs/ (21.9.2010). For the IO accounts, see the Report to the 
Government of Serbia on the Visit to Serbia carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 19 to 29 November 2007. Available at 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,COECPT,,SRB,4562d8b62,496daf432,0.html (28.8.2010). 
38  Although Yugoslavia does not exist anymore, some people are still emotionally attached to it and declared 
themselves to be Yugoslavs.  
39  Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Yugoslavia http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/index.php (13.9.2010). 
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Serbian police shared the fate of the military with regard to ethnic representation 
during the 1990s. First progress was made with the creation of a multiethnic police force 
after the Albanian armed rebellion in South Serbia ended in May 2001. In the following 
years, ethnic representation in the police gradually improved. Back in 2001, there were 
only 118 Albanian, 496 Hungarian and 380 Bosnian policemen.40 Five years later, these 
figures had increased to 296, 487 and 453 respectively. In spite of the increase in the 
absolute number of policemen from national minorities, they are still non-existent in 
senior positions. Members of the Roma community are particularly under-represented 
both in absolute terms and at a higher level of responsibility. Finally, it is difficult to 
speculate about ethnic representativeness with regard to the intelligence services, given 
the lack of any reliable and publicly accessible information. 
Institutional mechanisms as well as policies for gender mainstreaming in public 
administration had been established at the local, provincial and national level by 2009 
(Stojanović/Quesada 2010).41 In spite of the fact that there are still no gender-sensitive 
policies within the police, military or intelligence services as such, the representation of 
women in these institutions has significantly increased in the course of the last decade. 
This change is particularly visible in operational posts, to which women had limited 
access prior to the onset of the democratic transition.42 As the latest research on gender 
and SSR in Serbia concluded “most women in the security sector are still working in 
administrative, analytical and policy-formulating positions, and far fewer in operational 
jobs. Women are almost totally absent at management and command levels within 
security sector institutions that use coercive means (police, military, customs)” (Ibid: 14). 
For example, within the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior, both ministers, all 
state secretaries (five at the MoD and one at the MoI), and all deputy ministers (two at the 
MoD and three at the MoI) are men. 
The Ministry of Interior and the police already started to recruit women for 
operational posts in 2002 and have made the furthest progress so far (Hadžić et al. 2009: 
166-172; Stojanović/Quesada 2010: 68). For example, back in the 2001, only 29 women 
were employed as uniformed police personnel. Seven years later, this number skyrocketed 
to no fewer than 2,909. This still accounts for only around 10% of the total number of 
uniformed police personnel, far below the goal of 30% set by the Platform for Action of 
the Beijing Declaration adopted by the UN in 1995. The ratio is even more modest when 
the number of women at a higher level of responsibility is taken into account. For 
 
 
40  This increase is much bigger in relative terms, given that the total number of policemen has fallen 
significantly in the meantime. 
41  These policies at the national level are the National Strategy on the Improvement of the Position of Women 
and the Promotion of Gender Equality and the Road Map for the National Action Plan to implement the 
UNSCR 1325. The mechanisms are Gender Equality Council which is an inter-ministerial body, Gender 
Equality Directorate under the Ministry for Labour and Social Policy, the Deputy Ombudsperson, the 
Parliamentary Gender Equality Committee, the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. 
42  In contrast, civilian posts were open to women from the end of World War II. 
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example, in 2008, only 298 women held key management positions in the police (Hadžić 
et al. 2009: 170). This may be attributed to an unofficial human resources policy and a 
professional culture which favour men over women, but also to the admission quotas for 
female candidates at the Academy for Criminalist and Police Studies.43  
The Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces have also made significant 
progress, both in formal and in practical terms. Formally, men and women have equal 
rights and duties with regard to admission to the professional service, dress code, salaries, 
etc. One of the biggest steps forward was the opening of the Military Academy to female 
candidates in 2007. In 2010, around 40% of the civilian employees at the Ministry of 
Defence were female, most of them occupying administrative positions. However, less 
than 2% hold command or management positions (Ibid: 74). Additionally, there are 
currently only 330 professional female soldiers of whom 21 are officers. This number will 
increase when the first generation of 105 cadets who enrolled at the Military Academy in 
2007 will graduate and will be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Sergeant in 2011. 
Finally, there are no female pilots in the Air Force, although some women have gained the 
necessary training qualifications.44  
4.5 Transparency 
The Yugoslav and Serbian security sector was wrapped in a cloud of secrecy for more than 
half a century. A sea of laws and subordinate regulations enabled the members of the 
security sector to arbitrarily classify even the most trivial information. In that way, the 
system fought against real or imagined security threats as well as against internal 
democratic criticism. Conversely, new legislation regulating the transparency of the 
public administration at large and the security sector in particular has been enacted over 
the past decade. The Constitution of Serbia recognized the right to access information 
(Art. 51). The new Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance was passed in 
2004 under heavy pressure from NGOs grouped within the Coalition for the Free Access 
to Information. The law obliged institutions to make public information accessible to 
citizens, publish a civil service handbook and update it at least once a year. The Law also 
instituted the Commissioner responsible for its oversight. Public institutions have a duty 
to report periodically on their activities undertaken with respect to the Law, while citizens 
have the right to file complaints to the Commissioner if they believe that they have been 
denied free access to public information. The Law is very liberal since it stipulates that it is 
not up to citizens to prove that certain information is of public importance but to the 
institutions to prove why certain information has to be kept away from public (Art. 4). 
 
 
43  For the undergraduate level the quota is 21%, and for the specialist studies it is 30%. Source: MUP. 
44  Report of the Ombudsperson for 2009. p. 16. 
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The second important law which regulates this domain is the Law on Confidentiality of 
Data, which was also adopted under strong pressure from civil society and the EU in 
2009. The Law stipulates four levels of protection: Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and 
Restricted. Automatic access to classified information is granted to the President, the 
Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the National Assembly while other high functionaries 
have certain limitations.45 The adoption of the law in this field should minimize the space 
for voluntarism and arbitrariness in the classification of data. 
The situation with regard to the transparency of strategic orientation in the domain of 
national security has improved in formal terms since the National Assembly adopted 
Serbia's first National Security Strategy in 2009.46 However, this document avoided 
clarifying the state’s basic security and defence orientation. Thus, neither military 
neutrality, which is the official policy, nor NATO accession, which is privately preferred 
by the current Minister of Defence Dragan Šutanovac, are even mentioned in the 
document. This, however, does not mean that there is no policy at all, but rather that for 
political reasons the decision-makers are not ready to make it public. Similar confusion 
surrounds the government’s approach to the Kosovo problem. The National Security 
Strategy stated that the “separatist tendencies of part of the Albanian national minority in 
Kosovo and Metohija, which culminated in the illegal and unilateral declaration of 
independence of Kosovo, are a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Serbia and one of the most serious security challenges in the region”.47 However, the 
strategy does not elucidate how Serbia will deal with this threat and what its strategy 
toward the Kosovo problem actually looks like. On a declarative level, the Government 
hard-headedly reiterates that the independence of Kosovo represents the direst threat to 
national identity, security and regional and even global stability. On a practical level, it 
has recently become increasingly flexible and open to a constructive approach in concert 
with the EU.48 Ambiguity and ambivalence regarding these main strategic challenges may 
be a part of the current Government’s strategy. However, obscure foreign, security and 
defence strategies undermine the vertical accountability of the government and are in 
contradiction to the basic tenets of democratic governance.   
Although the normative framework for a transparent governance of the security sector 
has largely been put in place, in practice there are still many problems on a more 
operative level. Since its establishment, the institution of the Commissioner has been 
 
 
45  In certain cases, functionaries appointed by the National Assembly and judges can only access secret 
information after being vetted. Art. 38. 
46  Previous vision documents in the field of defence were the Defence Strategy (2004), Defence White Paper 
(2005) and Strategic Defence Review (2006). All of them were adopted during the period of existence of 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
47  Republic of Serbia, National Security Strategy, p. 8. 
48  This is especially so since September 2010 when the Government submitted, jointly with the EU, a 
resolution to the General Assembly regarding the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the 
legality of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. 
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facing a set of obstacles. These range from too few staff and a lack of workspace to the 
resistance of other institutions to implementing its decisions and recommendations. 
According to the Commissioner’s report, until 2008, the Security Information Agency 
had an “inadmissible, ignorant attitude towards the Law on Free Access to Information of 
Public Importance, civil and public rights and towards its own obligations under the Law 
as well”.49 Nevertheless, significant progress has been made following the change of 
management in July 2008.50 The Security Information Agency publishes its civil service 
handbook in accordance with the Commissioner’s guidelines. Furthermore, the Agency 
has started to respond positively to citizens’ requests for access to public information. The 
Ministry of Interior also had a mixed record when it came to transparency. Since 2004, it 
has been publishing the civil servant handbook on its official website, although it does not 
fully comply with the guidelines set by the Commissioner. The Ministry of Interior also 
developed institutional capacities for the application of the Law on Free Access to 
Information of Public Importance. Nevertheless, until 2009 it stood out as one of the 
institutions which complied least with the Law.51 Finally, its annual reports to the 
National Assembly are not available publicly. With regard to the private security sector, 
the Commissioner has so far not exercised any oversight. This is especially worrying given 
the sheer size of the sector and the fact that it offers private detective and intelligence 
services on the market without being accountable to any democratic institution. 
The National Assembly has also made an important step forward when it comes to 
transparency. It has developed sufficient institutional capacities to provide information to 
the public, while complaints filed against it are very rare. Its sessions are broadcast live on 
the national TV channel and sessions of its Defence and Security Committee are 
recorded. The Assembly has a website where summaries of all sessions can be found. 
Financial transparency 
The public sector in Serbia is still not transparent financially in spite of a certain amount of 
progress made over the past decade. According to the Open Budget Index (OBI) survey of 
85 countries, Serbia ranked 38th in 2008 with an OBI rating of 45% among those countries 
which provide only some information about their public spending. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(44%) and Albania (37%) were the only two countries in the Western Balkan region with 
worse results.52 Lack of financial transparency is particularly worrying when it comes to the 
 
 
49  Republic of Serbia, “Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, Report on the Implementation 
of the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance in 2008”. p. 11.  
50  Republic of Serbia, “Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, Report on the Implementation 
of the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance in 2008”. p. 12. 
51  Republic of Serbia, “Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, Report on the Implementation 
of the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance in 2008”. p. 10. 
52  Source: www.openbudgetindex.org/ (28.8.2010). 
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public security sector which makes up around 15% of the total government budget.53 To 
what extent this important aspect of security sector governance has been neglected is best 
illustrated by the fact that during the past decade it has not been scrutinized either by the 
Defence and Security Committee or by the State Audit Institution. What is more, 
institutions in the security sector are by and large exempted from the system of public 
procurement. This has contributed to the lack of financial accountability in the security 
sector as illustrated by several financial affairs and scandals.54 
So far we have seen that Serbia has largely accomplished the establishment of the 
institutional framework for the democratic governance of the security sector (table 2). A 
number of new institutions have been formally established but have yet to overcome 
serious obstacles in the practical implementation of their tasks. However, the biggest 
institutional changes have occurred within the existing institutions in the security sector. 
These institutional changes fit what Mahoney and Thelen called the layering when “new 
rules are attached to existing ones, thereby changing the ways in which the original rules 
structure behavior” (Mahoney/Thelen 2009: 16).55 Some of these changes, such as 
increasing transparency or representativeness, have been occurring gradually. Others 
were brought about abruptly like the introduction of the Service of Internal Control into 
the Ministry of Interior or the Inspector General within the military intelligence services. 
Eventually, the small changes have yet to accumulate to make possible a “big change over 
the long run” (Mahoney/Thelen 2009: 17).  
The institutional changes described have mainly been pushed exogenously, either by 
civil society, other public institutions or the international community (most prominently 
the EU and OSCE). The main reform actors have been political elites trying to create 
mechanisms that enable them to put formerly untouchable instruments of Milošević’s 
power under their civilian executive control. Some changes, such as the recent 
abandonment of the practice of having a representative of the opposition as chair of the 
parliamentary Security and Defence Committee, are the result of ongoing struggles 
among political actors within the institutions. Still, it is one thing to introduce the new 
rules of the game; implementing them in practice is another matter. The new rules 
discussed above have yet to go through institutionalization, which Samuel Huntington 
defined as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and 
stability” (Huntington 1968: 12). 
 
 
53  The total public spending for the security sector in 2010 will be more than 113.4 billion dinars (1.7 billion 
Euros) which is 14.87% of the total budget of the Republic of Serbia. The total spending for the security 
sector breaks down as follows: MoD – 67.5 billion dinars or 8.85%; MUP – 42.4 billion dinars or 5.56%; 
BIA – 3.5 billion dinars or 0.45%. Source: The Law on the Budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2010.  
54  The cases in point are the military financial scandals ‘Satellite’ and ‘Bulletproof Vest’ in 2005 and the 
police financial scandal involving the procurement of poor quality uniforms in 2008. 
55  They identify three more institutional changes: displacement, drift and conversion. 
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1. Horizontal 
accountability  
2. Vertical 
accountability  
3. Rule of law  4. Representation 5. Transparency 
Executive civilian control:  
 
- National Security 
Council (2006) 
 
- Inspector General in 
the military intelligence 
agencies (2009) 
 
- Principles of civilian 
control incorporated in 
defence and security 
legislation 
 
- Free and fair 
elections 
 
- Security sector 
declaratively 
opened to the 
civil society. 
 
- Law on 
Citizens’ 
Associations 
(2009) 
 
 
- Capacities of 
CSOs to create 
alternative 
expertise 
significantly 
increased 
 
 
 
Rechtsstaat:  
 
- Constitution 
(2006)  
 
- Major 
legislative 
packages were 
adopted in 2007 
and 2009. 
 
 
 
Ethnic 
representation 
 
- No formal 
obstacles to equal 
ethnic 
representation 
 
- No positive 
discrimination 
policies  
General 
transparency 
 
- Law on Free 
Access to 
Information of 
Public 
Importance 
(2004) 
 
- Law on 
Confidentiality 
of Data (2009) 
 
- National 
Security Strategy 
(2009) 
 
- Defence 
Strategy (2009) 
 
Parliamentary control:  
- Extensive formal 
competences for 
parliamentary control 
 
- Splitting of Defence and  
Security Committee into 
two separate bodies 
(2010) 
 
- Principles of 
parliamentary control 
incorporated in defence 
and security legislation 
Judicial review:  
- Abolishment of military 
courts (2004) 
- Principles of judicial 
review incorporated in 
defence and security 
legislation 
Human rights 
and civil 
liberties: 
 
- Police Code of 
Ethics (2003) 
- Right to 
conscientious 
objection (2003) 
 
- Internal 
control of Police 
(2005) 
 
-Freedom of 
worship and of 
association in 
the military 
(2007) 
Gender 
representation 
 
- Very few formal 
obstacles to equal 
gender 
representation 
 
- Military Academy 
opened to female 
cadets (2007) 
 
Financial 
transparency 
 
- State Audit 
Institution 
(2007) 
Oversight of independent 
bodies:  
- Commissioner for 
Information of Public 
Importance and Personal 
Data Protection (2004) 
 
- Ombudsperson (2005) 
-State Audit Institution 
(2007) 
   
 
Table 2: Normative and institutional framework for democratic security sector governance in Serbia 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations 
The first part of this report developed a concept of democratic security sector governance 
based on five principles – horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, the rule of 
law, representativeness and transparency. In the second part, the wider context of 
democratization and security sector reform was discussed. It was shown that a set of 
obstacles have been hindering both democratization and security sector reforms in Serbia 
since 5 October 2000. The structural obstacles encompass the unresolved issues of 
statehood, the fractured political scene and the lack of international incentives. The 
institutional obstacles are related to the historical legacy and co-opted transition. Finally, 
a deep symbolic fracture within the Serbian polity between national-liberational and 
civic-democratic discourses has been an ideological obstacle to reforms. In the third part, 
the report applied an analytical framework with the aim of analysing the democratization 
of the security sector in Serbia in the period 2000 to 2010. Our main conclusion is that 
formal mechanisms of democratic security sector governance have largely been 
established in the period under observation, although they suffer from certain 
shortcomings. The implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the newly 
introduced democratic norms have yet to be consolidated.  
The least problematic area so far has been the consolidation of civilian executive 
control over the security sector. It was by and large established following the assassination 
of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in March 2003. Regrettably, civilian executive control is 
too often characterized by an excessive meddling of civilians in the operational 
management of the security apparatus which has kept its clientelist status. A certain 
institutionalization and implementation of democratic security sector governance was 
achieved where it did not tie the hands of either the ruling elites or the security apparatus. 
The case in point is the improvement in gender balance and to a lesser extent in the 
ethnic representativeness of staff in the security sector. Least implemented were those 
norms of democratic governance which were potentially threatening either for those in 
power (e.g. public oversight), for parts of the security apparatus (e.g. human rights) or for 
both sides (e.g. financial transparency). 
Several policy recommendations can be made for overcoming the implementation gap. 
First, it is crucial to increase awareness of the fact that the erection of a formal 
institutional framework is a necessary but not sufficient step towards a consolidated 
democracy. Without the institutionalization of democratic practices in the security sector, 
democracy in Serbia will remain flawed. Domestic policy-makers should continue to 
focus on building institutional capacities for democratic security sector governance on all 
levels, from local to national, in the private sector, in civil society and in state institutions. 
However, they should also foster the development of a democratic organizational and 
strategic culture which favours transparency, accountability, the rule of law and peaceful 
conflict resolution. The international community has a strong role to play here too. Since 
Serbia has declared its military neutrality, NATO cannot, for the time being, drive the 
reforms through its conditionality policy as it did with other CEE countries. The EU, 
whose conditionality policy proved to be very effective in other policy areas, could be an 
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effective substitute in the security and defence domain. The EU embraced the concept of 
SSR in 2006 but has yet to incorporate it properly in its conditionality policy. A good way 
to start is to pay more attention to SSR in the European Commission’s Annual Progress 
Report. The EU should encourage Serbian civil society organizations and independent 
think tanks to monitor the practical implementation of newly adopted norms of 
democratic security sector governance. 
Second, certain legislative and policy changes and improvements need to be made. 
Maybe most importantly, the position of the National Assembly in the political system of 
Serbia needs to be strengthened, especially the independence of MPs vis-à-vis their 
constituent political parties. The infamous Article 102 of the Constitution allowing for the 
practice of ‘blank resignations’ should be revoked. The same goes for Article 14a of the 
Law on the Serbian Armed Forces. Furthermore, the new Law on the Security Intelligence 
Agency could reinforce parliamentary control, public oversight and the internal control of 
the Security Information Agency. In addition, the adoption of laws on the democratic 
control of the security sector and private security companies would significantly improve 
the normative framework for democratic security sector governance. It is also essential to 
harmonize the existing laws which regulate the application of special investigative 
measures with the Constitution. Strategic documents should clarify the foreign, security 
and defence policy of Serbia. These documents should transparently present the strategic 
orientation of the government vis-à-vis key foreign, security and defence challenges such 
as Kosovo, NATO, EU, regional issues, etc. Additionally, secret political dossiers 
compiled by previous regimes should be made open to the public while the lustration 
process should be reconsidered. It is never too late for this as the case of late lustration in 
Romania shows. Finally, specific gender and ethnic-sensitive policies should be devised 
within the security sector institutions promoting not only the recruitment but also the 
advancement of women and members of ethnic minorities to higher decision-making 
positions. 
Third, oversight mechanisms need to strengthen capacities in order to be able to 
properly scrutinize the operations of the security sector. It is of particular importance that 
the National Assembly and its two main oversight bodies (Committee for Defence and 
Internal Affairs and the Committee for Security Services) develop capacities and the 
necessary security expertise for effective oversight and control. Special attention should be 
paid to issues that are within their formal competence but that have so far remained 
outside their effective remit such as budgetary control, private security companies, 
customs administration, prison guards, the administration for the prevention of money 
laundering, the tax police and the military industrial complex.  
Fourth, civil society needs to intensify its active participation in security affairs at all 
levels, from human and local, through national to international security. National and 
local media have an important role to play here. They could be assisted in developing 
genuine capacities for investigative journalism in the sphere of security and defence. 
Advocacy-oriented NGOs, which played a key role in passing various pieces of legislation, 
should be encouraged to develop capacities to also monitor its implementation. Research-
oriented NGOs should be encouraged to evolve into think tanks with stronger capacities 
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for the sustained production of sound, empirically based policy analyses and proposals. 
Dialogue and cooperation should be fostered between governmental, non-governmental 
and university research communities in the field of security and defence studies. Smaller 
NGOs involved in security issues outside of Belgrade should be given assistance to build 
fund-raising capacities and better networks both nationally and internationally. New 
opportunities for domestic funding should be created both through the state and the 
private economy.  
Ultimately, one should be patient. Democratic security sector governance cannot be 
established overnight. To begin with, however, it should be taken seriously. 
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7. Appendix 
7.1 List of abbreviations 
BIA  Security Information Agency (Bezbednosno informativna agencija) 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe  
CSO Civil Society Organization 
DS Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka) 
DSS Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije) 
EU European Union 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
JSO Special Operations Unit (Jedinica za specijalne operacije) 
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija) 
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army 
MUP Ministry of Interior (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova) 
MoD Ministry of Defence (Ministartstvo odbrane) 
MP Member of Parliament 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non Governmental Organization 
OBI Open Budget Index 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
RDB State Security Agency (Resor državne bezbednosti) 
SAF Serbian Armed Forces (Vojska Srbije) 
SCG State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Državna zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora) 
SNS Serbian Progress Party (Srpska narodna stranka) 
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije) 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
SRS Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka) 
SRJ Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna republika Jugoslavija) 
VBA Military Security Agency (Vojnobezbednosna agencija) 
VJ Military of Yugoslavia (Vojska Jugoslavije) 
VOA Military Intelligence Agency (Vojnoobaveštajna agencija) 
VSCG Military of Serbia and Montenegro (Vojska Srbije i Crne Gore) 
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7.2  A note on pronunciation 
c  is pronounced like  ‘ts’ in cats 
č  is pronounced like  ‘ch’ in chop 
ć   is pronounced like  ‘t’ in palatalized tune 
đ  is pronounced like  ‘j’ in juice 
dž  is pronounced like  ‘j’ in jeans  
j  is pronounced like  ‘y’ in yes 
lj  is pronounced like  ‘ll’ in million 
š  is pronounced like  ‘sh’ in shop 
ž  is pronounced like  ‘s’ in pleasure 
